|
Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency (COIN) |
|
|
General Information
Books on Afghanistan
|
Afghan War News > General Info > Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
The intelligence activities and functions of military units and other governmental agencies have been transformed over the past ten years (since 2001) as a result of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Many of these organizations have had to shift their intelligence focus from the big land battle involving large manuever formations to small infantry engagements conducting counterinsurgency. Courses of study have now been established to provide training in this new direction. Lucrative contracts have been awarded to civilian firms to provide additional intelligence support to the counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan. Emphasis is now placed on the "human terrain" and cultural aspects of the indigenous population in order to support a population-centric strategy. 1. Military manuals now incorporate sections on intel support to COIN. 2. Organizations and firms in the private sector are also providing publications that assist in the intelligence effort related to counterinsurgency (for a profit of course). 3. This web page provides a collection of news articles, papers, publications, references, and reports about the intelligence support to the COIN or counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan.
Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations. Report by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence, February 2011. Accessed on the Office of the Secretary of Defense website here January 2012. (Adobe PDF). "Partnership Till it Hurts" The Use of Fusion Cells to Establish Unity of Effort Between SOF (Yin) and Conventional Forces (Yang). By Paul Lushenko, 2010. Accessed on Small Wars Journal here January 2012. (Adobe PDF). Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan. By MG Michael T. Flynn, January 2010. Accessed here on the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) website on January 18, 2012. (Adobe PDF). To Provide Focus: Intelligence and Counterinsurgency. By LTC Daniel Villeneuve, Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 10.4 (Winter 2008), 58-73. Accessed here January 2012. (Adobe PDF). Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies. By Walter L. Perry and John Gordon IV, RAND Corporation, 2008. Accessed here on RAND website on January 18, 2012. (Adobe PDF). Counterinsurgency from Below: The Afghan Local Police in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective. By Joe Quinn and Mario A. Fumerton, CAAT, November 2010. Accessed on Ronna-Afghan website here on January 10, 2012. (Adobe PDF). The Vital Role of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations. By Colonel David J. Clark. U.S. Army War College, March 15, 2006. Accessed here on January 18, 2012 on the Homeland Security Digital Library of the Naval Postgraduate School. (Adobe PDF).
Joint Pub 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, 5 October 2009. See Chapter V. Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency. Accessed here on dtic.mil website January 2012. (Adobe PDF).
Culture-Intelligence.net. Providing
research, fieldguide, magazine, training and resources on cultural
intelligence.
January 9, 2012. Counterinsurgency, What Do You Really Know? Keith Boyea's Blog. A writer wonders if knowing the "human terrain" is doing any good. July 19, 2011. Counterinsurgency, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations. Journalist's Resource. May 25, 2011. Task force blasts DOD for mishandling intelligence operations. Stars and Stripes. March 10, 2011. Afghan National Civil Order Police officers practice intelligence gathering, relationship building. DVIDS.
The Role of Intelligence in Sustainment Operations. By LTC Meeks and MAJ Brundige. Army Sustainment, PB 700-10-01 Volume 42, Issue 1, January - February 2010. Accessed here on January 19, 2012. The Importance of Intelligence in Combating a Modern Insurgency. By Kevin Reamer, Journal of Strategic Security, 2 (2): 73-90, 2009. Accessed here January 2012. Why Defeating Insurgencies Is Hard: The Effect of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations - A Best-Case Scenario. By Moshe Kress and Roberto Szechtman. Operations Research, Vol. 57, No. 3, May-June 2009, pp. 578-585. Accessed here on NPS.edu January 2012. (Adobe PDF). Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency. By Kyle Teamey and LTC Jonathan Sweet. Military Review, September-October 2006. Accessed here in January 2012 on U.S. Air Force University website. (Adobe PDF). People, Partnerships and Collaboration: Understanding and Improving Intelligence in Counterinsurgency. An article in the Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies. By Matt Calvin, University of Denver, M.A. Candidate, International Security. Accessed here on University of Denver website January 2012. (Adobe PDF).
1. Report to Congress on the Implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. By Secretary of Defense, April 1, 2007. Accessed here on defense.gov website January 2012. (Adobe PDF). See page 20 for comments on how to improve intelligence support to stability operations. 2. Joint Pub 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, 5 October 2009. See Chapter V. Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency. Accessed here on dtic.mil website January 2012. (Adobe PDF). 3. See Cultural-Intelligence.Net at www.cultural-intelligence.net to view a website providing information (and publications for sale) on "socio-cultural knowledge". |
All external sites open up in an new window. Please report any broken links or inaccuracies in content to the webmaster at staff@afghanwarnews.info.
|
|