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Afghanistan Peace Talks |
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General Information
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Afghan War News > General Info > Peace Talks / Reconciliation
The Afghan War - at least from a U.S. perspective - has been going on since the fall of 2001 when a small force (less than 300) of U.S. Army Special Forces, Air Force JTACs, and CIA operatives infiltrated Afghanistan and assisted the Northern Alliance and other groups in toppling the Taliban regime. The situtation in Afghanistan was quiet for a few years and we shifted our attention to Iraq. While we were focused on invading and consolidating our occupation of Iraq the Taliban were slowly building their insurgency. This insurgency has gained strength - especially since 2006 - and currently numbers over 20,000 personnel and controls large parts of Afghanistan. The U.S. and other International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) members are ready to depart Afghanistan (by 2014) but they want to leave behind a government that won't give sanctuary to terrorists and that is somewhat "friendly" to the outside world. However . . . it just doesn't seem possible to defeat the insurgency before 2014 (our pullout date) and leave behind a Afghan government that can survive without the combat troops of ISAF. For this reason many feel that negotiations with the Taliban and other insurgent groups are necessary. Many insurgencies actually end with a political settlement and not a military solution. Therefore the big push for a reconciliation with the insurgents.
Click here for a chronological listing of The Historical Example of the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Surprisingly, the government the Soviets left behind in Kabul after their withdrawal remained in power for about four years. The government continued to function and the security forces managed to hold their own against the many mujahadeen groups. It was only after the Soviet Union fell apart - and the equipment, money, supplies, weapons, and more stopped flowing from the Soviet Union to the Afghan government - that the Afghan government fell. History Lesson of Vietnam. Peace talks helped us disengage from the Vietnam conflict (with a little help from Operation Linebacker II). We withdrew (most of our combat forces) in 1973; keeping advisors and some supporting units in country until 1975. Even though the peace talks allowed the North Vietnamese to keep 140,000 troops in South Vietnam the South Vietnamese government manage to survive two more years. It was only after the U.S. Congress cut off all funding and aid (weapons, ammunition, and supplies) that the South Vietnamese Army fell apart and the government fell to the North Vietnam conventional forces. What the Paris Peace Talks did give the United States was a Decent Interval between our departure and the fall of the South Vietnam government. 1. Some Pararels with Vietnam and Afghanistan. We find two things in common with Vietnam and Afghanistan. The South Vietnam government was and the Afghan government is corrupt and ineffective. Both Thieu (the leader of the South Vietnam government) and Karzai can be called inept and corrupt. Neither government enjoyed strong support of the general population. Are the Taliban Serious about Peace Talks? Many critics claim that the Taliban are merely engaging in peace talks so they can run out the clock to the end of 2014 when the coalition departs Afghanistan . . . then move to topple the Karzai regime. Observers of past Taliban negotiations believe the Taliban will renege on any promises made during negotiations. 2. What Does the U.S. Hope to Gain from the Peace Talks? The U.S. recognizes that the Taliban will not be defeated by 2014 and realizes that the Afghan security forces will not have matured to the extent needed to defend the country from insurgents. It is hopeed that some sort of political solution can be negotiated that will keep the Taliban from taking power and leave a government behind that will not allow sanctuary to al-Qaeda. Perhaps the most likely scenario is that the U.S. is provided another Decent Interval. 1. Who has the Strong Hand at the Peace Talk Table? It is not the U.S. and its allies. They are burdened with a non-cooperative, ineffective, inefficient and corrupt Afghan government that has little popular support. The U.S and its allies are also are worn down by the ten-year war that has been costly in lives and money. The lead nation in the coalition (U.S.) has a President determined to win re-election - and he needs to show progress in dis-engaging from Afghanistan. The Karzai regime doesn't hold the cards - without the coalition combat support and massive amounts of dollars provided by international donors his government folds. So that would leave the Taliban with the strongest bargaining position. The Taliban have taken some losses over the past two years; but they are not beaten. They have sanctuaries in Pakistan, receive support from Pakistan, and they continue to be funded through the drug trade and international donors. They can use the peace negotiations to extract concessions and strengthen their position politically and militarily. However, they will most likely use the negotiations as a stalling tactic and bide their time until 2014. Pakistan is a another matter - do we really know where they stand in the entire process?
Afghanistan. United States Institute of Peace. International Crisis Group (ICG). Talking About Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan. Asia Report No 221. March 26, 2012. Accessed here on March 26, 2012. Afghanistan - Negotiating Peace. The Report of The Century Foundation International Task Force on Afghanistan in Its Regional and Mulilateral Dimensions. By Lakhdar Brahimi and Thomas R. Pickering, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 2011. Accessed here on February 3, 2012. Afghan Peace Talks - A Primer. By James Shinn and James Dobbins. RAND Corporation, 2011. Accessed here on February 3, 2012. Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan. By Lisa Schirch, United States Institute of Peace, September 2011. Accessed here on February 3, 2012. Beyond Power-sharing: Institutional Options for an Afghan Peace Process. By Hamish Nixon and Caroline Hartzell, United States Institute of Peace, December 2011. Accessed here on February 3, 2012. Recalibrating the Afghan Reconciliation Program. By Amin Tarzi, The Prism, 1, No. 4, 2010. Accessed here on on NDU Press on February 3, 2012. Thwarting Afghanistan's Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach toward Peace and Reconciliation. Special Report by Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai. United States Institute of Peace. September 2008. Accessed here on February 3, 2012.
1. For a detailed read on the two-year span between the Paris Peace Talks of 1973 and the collapse of the Saigon regime in May 1975 read "Decent Interval". This book was wrote by Frank Snepp, a CIA operative who spent five years in Vietnam and was one of the last to evacuate the embassy on April 29, 1975. A description of the book is available at Amazon.com at the link below: 2. For an early example of the Taliban's record of not keeping their word or telling the truth read an account of the U.S. diplomatic talks with the Taliban during the 1996 - 1997 time frame. See The Taliban on al Qaeda, 1996-97, Threat Matrix, February 5, 2012. Accessed here February 6, 2012.
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