Afghan National Army (ANA)
Books on Afghanistan
Early 2000s. The first units of the present-day Afghan National Army were established in late 2002. The training classes were battalion-sized units, called Kandaks, and consisted of 500-900 men. The very first battalion (1st Battalion, Afghan National Guard) was trained by personnel from the British Army. Subsequent trainers were Special Forces detachments from 1st Battalion 3rd Special Forces Group followed by 5th Battalion 19th Special Forces. Once trained a Kandak would be deployed, advised and assisted by a Special Forces detachment from the CJSOTF-A, to different parts of the country. In the early 2000s training was conducted at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC). Conditions were harsh with little equipment for the recruits (uniforms, boots, weapons, etc.) and buildings with no heat. The pay was a paltry $30 a month and desertion rates were extremely high.
Vetting of Recruits. Current procedures (instituted in March 2011) for vetting recruits for the ANSF is an eight-step process. This includes: (see 2.)
1) Valid Tazkera
(Afghan identity card)
Organization. The Afghan National Army has six corps headquarters and two Capital divisions (111th and 112th). In addition to the infantry units there are military police, intelligence, route clearance (for IEDs), combat support, medical, aviation, and logistic units. Each ANA corps has on average 3 to 4 brigades to include a Corps Engineer Kandak, Military Intelligence Kandak, and other varied support units. In addition, some corps are now being augmented with a Mobile Strike Force (MSF). Each ANA brigade has 4-6 infantry kandaks, one Combat Support Kandak (CSK), and one Combat Service Support Kandak (CSSK).
Constant Turnover of ANA. One of the big problems is the high constant turnover of members of the Afghan National Army. This is caused by two factors - the high desertion rate and low re-enlistment rate. 3. Not only does this drive costs up for recruitment efforts but it increases the cost of the training effort and decreases the effectiveness of the ANA. A third of the Army's force has to be recruited and trained every year. Currently the ANA is about 195,000 strong (as of October 2012). There are many reasons cited for the high desertion rate and lack of second termers - including poor pay, corrupt officers, lack of equipment, sub-standard living conditions, terrible medical care, and the pressure of the Taliban and chance of dying in combat.
Training of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A) is responsible for assisting the Ministry of Defense (MoD) with the training of the ANA. The NTM-A website can be accessed here. The NTM-A mission statement reads as follows "NTM-A suppports ISAF to enable accountable, Afghan led security not later than 31 December 2014". Hmmmmm. Let's just say there is lots more work to be done before December 2014. Office cadet training is taking place at a training facility near Kabul informally called 'Sandhurst in the Sand'; the official name is the Afghan National Army Officer Academy or ANA-OA.
Afghan Army Air Corps. The Afghan Army Air Corps was at one time part of the ANA. The air component has now been redesignated as the Afghan Air Force or AAF. The Afghan Air Force was created in 2007 and currently (as of Fall 2013) has more than 6,000 personnel. It has a variety of aircraft to include helicopters and light fix-wing aircraft.
Logistics of the ANA. One of the shortfalls of the ANA is its poor logistical system. Although it has made progress in it's ability to provide its units with material, supply, food, and ammunition it still has a long way to go to be ready by the end of 2014. Glowing reports from ISAF and NTM-A about how the ANA logistical system is up and running should be tempered with regard to 'from the field' reporting from company, battalion, and brigade level Battle Space Owners (BSOs), Battle Space Integrators (BSIs), Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams (SFAATs), and advisors about how far behind the ANA logistics and maintenance programs are in being self-sufficient without coalition assistance.
Literacy. One of the biggest challenges for the Afghan National Army is literacy. Currently, as of April 2014, less than 20 percent of the Afghans in the army are functionally literate. This means that more than 80 percent cannot read written orders or write reports. 4. While the Nato Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A) has a literacy training program the results have been criticized by observers. 5.
Artillery. The main gun for the ANA is the 122 mm D-30 howitzer. Usually 6-8 of these artillery pieces are found at the brigade level. Learn more about the 122-mm D-30.
Transition to Afghans in the Lead for Security. 2013 saw the turning over of security to the Afghans. The ANSF are now in the lead with the Coalition in a supporting role. The vast majority of the fighting conducted in the 2013 fighting season was done by the ANSF. For the most part the ANSF has held its own - not losing too much real estate and keeping control of the major population centers and the important Highways 1 and 7. Then ANSF has had trouble keeping control of many of the remote districts - notably Sangin district in Helmand province.
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF): Training and Development. ISAF Media Backgrounder. February 2012. Provides info on current state of the ANSF as of February 2012. Adobe PDF file available here.
Afghan National Army Special Forces. The ANASF are the elite of the ANA. Their training base is Camp Moorehead near Kabul. Recruitment for the ANASF is very selective and the training is difficult and comprehensive. Learn more about the ANASF.
Afghan National Army. Wikipedia.
May 13, 2013. Afghan National Army Systems by Warfighting Function, 162D Infantry Brigade.
June 2011. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Background paper for media by ISAF.
May 10, 2011. "No Time to Lose". Promoting the accountability of the Afghan National Security Forces. Joint Briefing Paper. Oxfam.
April 2011. "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan". Department of Defense.
March 15, 2011. Statement of Gen Petraeus Before Senate Armed Services Committee. General Petraeus.
January 17, 2013. "Which Way Did the Taliban Go?" The New York Times Magazine. An interesting report on how an ANA kandak operates - provides some info on the Military Advisor Team that advises the kandak.
October 28, 2012. "Afghan Army Seeks Better Equipment, But Lacks Basic Skills". NPR.
January 25, 2012. "Afghan army's night raiders ready to take control". Reuters.
May 9, 2011. "Afghan National Army update, May 2011". The Long War Journal.
1. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF): Training and Development. ISAF Media Backgrounder. February 2012. Provides info on current state of the ANSF as of February 2012. Adobe PDF file available here.
2. Statement on Use of Afghan Nationals to Provide Security to U.S. Forces. Presented to the House Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, January 31, 2012. Accessed here on February 2, 2012.
3. See "Afghan Army's Turnover Threatens U.S. Strategy", The New York Times, October 15, 2012 accessed here for more on how the high turnover affects the ANA.
4. For more on ANA literacy read "Literate Afghans are key to sustainability", DVIDS, April 4, 2014 here.
5. For more on issues with the NTM-A literacy training program for the ANSF see blog posts from Afghan War News about literacy and the ANSF.
All external sites open up
in an new window. Please report any broken links to the webmaster at