Maintenance

The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have had a difficult time in maintaining the equipment provided to them by the international community.

Logistical Chain. Historically the logistical system can't provide the repair parts to the lower echelon units on a timely basis - if at all. In addition, many of the parts at corps or brigade level sit in storage containers on shelves and are not issued to the brigades or kandaks. Some repair parts - especially vehicle parts - find their way to civilian markets via corrupt ANDSF personnel.

Maintenance Expertise. Most of the soldiers and policemen are illiterate and can't read maintenance manuals. Some repair manuals are in English and have not yet been translated. Those personnel who do receive training and acquire an expertise in computer repair, vehicle maintenance, etc. will leave the police or army and seek a more rewarding career in civilian life.

Assessment of ANDSF Maintenance Programs. The DoD has firsthand information on the abiilty of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) and the Afghan Air Force (AAF) to conduct maintenance on vehicles, aircraft, and other military equipment. This is due to the presence of NATO advisors at the 'tactical' level within the organization of the ANDSF. However, information about the maintenance posture of the police and army units below corps / zone level is incomplete as advisors and trainers are not at the brigade / kandak or provincial / district level of the army or police. The DoD and NATO relies on the 'self-assessment' of the maintenance abilities of the army and police - which are considered very unreliable.

Reports Related to Maintenance

SIGAR, Afghan National Maintenance Strategy: Ground Vehicle Support, October 2019, SIGAR 20-05-SP. The DOD has taken action to reduce spares parts overhead costs.
 www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/SIGAR-20-05-SP.pdf

GAO, Afghanistan Security, Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, October 2018. Some improvements reported in Afghan Forces capabilities, but actions needed to enhance DoD oversight of U.S. purchased equipment
www.gao.gov/assets/700/695012.pdf